Solitary Resentment

Those who understand the art of statecraft must possess far-sightedness and keen observation; without keen observation, they cannot discern hidden private interests. Those who can enforce the rule of law must be resolute, firm, and upright; without uprightness, they cannot correct treacherous conduct. Officials who abide by the law in handling affairs and govern their offices according to legal statutes cannot be called "powerful men." What are called powerful men are those who do not follow the law but act arbitrarily, destroy the law to pursue private gain, waste state resources to benefit their own factions, and whose power can control the ruler—these are the so-called powerful men. Those who understand statecraft are keen in observation; when employed by the ruler, they can see through the hidden private dealings of powerful men. Those who can enforce the rule of law are upright and resolute; when employed by the ruler, they can correct the treacherous actions of powerful men. Therefore, when those who understand statecraft and can enforce the law are put into office, then the eminent and important ministers will inevitably be excluded from the law. Hence, those who understand statecraft and law are irreconcilable enemies of those in power.

Those in power monopolize the key levers of state affairs, and thus both those inside and outside the court are used by them. Therefore, if other feudal lords do not rely on them, their affairs cannot be accomplished, so enemy states sing their praises. If the hundred officials do not rely on them, their positions cannot be advanced, so all the ministers are used by them. If the palace attendants do not rely on them, they cannot gain access to the ruler, so the ruler's close attendants all conceal their misdeeds. If the learned scholars do not rely on them, their salaries will be meager and their treatment low, so the scholars all extol them. These four types of auxiliary forces are the tools which treacherous ministers use to adorn themselves. The powerful men cannot be loyal to the ruler and recommend their own enemies; the ruler cannot see through these four auxiliary forces to discern his own ministers. Thus, the ruler becomes increasingly deceived while the ministers become ever more powerful.

Generally speaking, those in power are rarely not trusted and favored by the ruler, and moreover, they are closely related and familiar. As for catering to the ruler's inclinations and sharing his likes and dislikes, this is precisely the means by which they gained their positions. Their official ranks are eminent and important, their cliques are numerous, and the entire state sings their praises. Then the scholar of statecraft and law, wishing to seek an audience with the ruler, lacks that trusted and favored close relationship, lacks the grace of intimacy and familiarity, and moreover, will use the principles of statecraft and law to correct the ruler's biased and evil inclinations—this goes against the ruler's heart. They are in a position of lowliness and inferiority, have no clique, and are isolated and unsupported. Contending with the trusted and favored from a position of estrangement, reason dictates that they cannot prevail. Contending with the intimate and familiar as a newcomer, reason dictates that they cannot prevail. Contending with those who cater to likes and dislikes by going against the ruler's heart, reason dictates that they cannot prevail. Contending with the eminent and important from a lowly and despised position, reason dictates that they cannot prevail. Contending with the entire state with only one man's voice, reason dictates that they cannot prevail. The scholar of statecraft and law, placed in these five positions where victory is impossible, and furthermore, for years unable to see the ruler, while those in power, armed with these five advantages, plead their cases before the ruler from morning till night—then what avenue does the scholar of statecraft and law have to gain entry, and when can the ruler ever be awakened? Therefore, relying on circumstances where victory is absolutely impossible, yet being in an irreconcilable position, how can the scholar of statecraft and law avoid danger? Those who can be framed with a crime are killed by public law; those who cannot be burdened with a crime are finished off by private assassins. Thus, it appears that those who make statecraft and law public and go against the ruler's heart will, if not executed by officials, certainly die at the hands of private assassins. Those who form cliques to deceive the ruler and speak twisted words to benefit private factions are inevitably trusted by the powerful men. Therefore, those who can be credited with achievements are made eminent through official rank; those who cannot be lent good reputations are made powerful through external influence. Thus, those who deceive the ruler and attach themselves to private factions either become eminent in official rank or important through external influence. Now, the ruler, without verifying and comparing, imposes punishments, and without waiting to see achievements, bestows rank and emoluments. So how can the scholar of statecraft and law risk death to present their proposals? How can treacherous ministers be willing to abandon profit and withdraw themselves? Hence, the ruler's status becomes increasingly lowly, and that of private factions becomes increasingly exalted.

Although the state of Yue was wealthy and its army strong, the rulers of the Central States all knew that it was of no benefit to them, saying: "This is not something I can control." Now, those who possess states, though their territories are vast and populations numerous, yet the ruler is blocked and deceived, and the great ministers monopolize power—thus the state becomes like Yue. They know that they are not as good as Yue, yet they do not know that their own states are also not as good as Yue—this is a failure to recognize analogous situations. People say that Qi was destroyed, but this does not refer to its territory and cities being destroyed; it means that the Lü clan could not control it and the Tian clan occupied it. People say that Jin was destroyed, but this does not refer to its territory and cities being destroyed; it means that the Ji clan could not control it and the Six Ministers monopolized it. Now, if the great ministers hold authority and make decisions arbitrarily, and the ruler does not know to reclaim that power, this is the ruler's lack of wisdom. Those who suffer from the same illness as a dead man cannot live; those who follow the same path as a ruined state cannot survive. Now, following the old road of Qi and Jin, and wishing for the state to be secure and survive—this is impossible.

Generally speaking, the reason why statecraft and law are difficult to implement is not limited to states of ten thousand chariots; it is the same for states of a thousand chariots. The ruler's close attendants are not necessarily wise; the ruler considers someone wise and listens to them, then discusses that person's words with his close attendants—this is discussing wisdom with the foolish. The ruler's close attendants are not necessarily worthy; the ruler considers someone worthy and treats them with courtesy, then discusses that person's conduct with his close attendants—this is discussing worthiness with the unworthy. The wise are decided by the foolish, the worthy are judged by the unworthy; then the worthy and wise will feel ashamed, and the ruler's judgments will be perverse. When ministers seek office, those who cultivate their conduct will restrain themselves through purity and integrity, and those who are wise will advance their careers through good governance and discernment. Those who cultivate their conduct cannot serve others with material bribes; relying on their own purity and integrity, and moreover unable to violate the law in governance, then the cultivated and wise will not serve the ruler's close attendants nor heed requests. The ruler's close attendants, whose conduct is not like Bo Yi's, if they cannot obtain bribes and gifts are not sent, then the achievements of purity and discernment will cease, and slanderous accusations will arise. The achievements of good governance are suppressed by the ruler's close confidants, and the conduct of purity and integrity is determined by slander and praise; then the cultivated and wise officials will be dismissed, and the ruler's insight will be blocked. Without relying on achievements to determine wisdom and conduct, without using verification and comparison to examine crimes, but listening to the words of close attendants, then the incompetent will be in the court, and foolish and corrupt officials will occupy official posts.

The calamity of a state of ten thousand chariots lies in the ministers having too much power; the calamity of a state of a thousand chariots lies in the close attendants being too trusted: these are the common calamities of rulers. Moreover, when a minister has great crimes, the ruler has great faults; the interests of the minister and the ruler are mutually different. How is this proven? The answer: The ruler’s interest lies in capable men being appointed to office, while the minister’s interest lies in incompetent men obtaining positions; the ruler’s interest lies in meritorious men receiving rank and emolument, while the minister’s interest lies in men without merit attaining wealth and honor; the ruler’s interest lies in outstanding men exerting their talents, while the minister’s interest lies in forming cliques for private gain. Thus, the state’s territory is reduced while private families become wealthy; the ruler’s position is debased while the minister’s power becomes significant. Therefore, the ruler loses his authority and the minister gains the state; the ruler is demoted to the status of a vassal lord, and the chancellor uses the tally and seal. This is how ministers deceive the ruler and benefit their private interests. Hence, among the important ministers of the present age, those who can retain favor when the ruler’s power changes are fewer than two or three out of ten. What is the reason for this? Because the ministers’ crimes are too great. Ministers with great crimes act to deceive the ruler, and their crimes warrant the death penalty. Wise men, having far-reaching insight and fearing death, will certainly not follow such powerful men; worthy men, cultivating integrity and being ashamed to join with treacherous ministers in deceiving the ruler, will certainly not follow such powerful ministers. Therefore, the cliques of those in power are either stupid and unaware of disaster, or else corrupt and unwilling to avoid villainy. The ministers, holding these stupid and corrupt men, join with them above to deceive the ruler, and below to plunder profit and seize assets, forming cliques for private gain, colluding with one another, confusing the ruler and corrupting the law, in order to disturb the scholar-commoners, causing the state to become endangered and weakened, and the ruler to be burdened and humiliated—these are great crimes. When ministers have great crimes and the ruler does not prohibit them, this is a great fault. If the ruler above has great faults and the ministers below have great crimes, seeking that the state not perish is impossible.