Guarding the Inner Quarters

The ruler’s misfortune lies in trusting others. If he trusts others, he will be controlled by them. Ministers have no blood kinship with the ruler; they are only bound by power and compelled to serve him. Thus, ministers ceaselessly probe the ruler’s thoughts, while the ruler sits above in indolence and arrogance—this is why there are cases of rulers being seized or assassinated. If the ruler trusts his son too much, can exploit the son for private gain; thus Li Dui, as tutor to the King of Zhao, starved the Lord Father (King Wuling of Zhao) to death. If the ruler trusts his wife too much, can exploit the wife for private gain; thus Youshi, as tutor to Li Ji, killed Prince Shensheng and installed Xiqi. Even with a wife so close and a son so beloved, they cannot be trusted—so none of the rest can be trusted either.

Moreover, the rulers of states with ten thousand chariots, or those with a thousand chariots, have consorts and wives whose sons are established as heirs, and some of these women wish for their lord’s early death. How can one know this? Between husband and wife, there is no blood kinship; if they love each other, they are close; if not, they are estranged. As the saying goes: “If the mother is beautiful, her son is taken into the father’s arms.” Conversely, if the mother is ugly, her son is cast aside. A man at fifty has not yet weakened in his desire for beauty, but a woman at thirty has already lost her allure. Serving a man whose lust remains undiminished with a woman whose beauty has faded means she will be distanced and debased, and her son will be suspected of being unfit to inherit—hence the consorts and wives’ wish for the lord’s death. Only if the mother becomes queen dowager and the son becomes ruler can orders be invariably carried out, prohibitions be invariably halted, the pleasures of intimacy not diminish compared to when the former lord lived, and the power of a ten-thousand-chariot state be wielded without doubt—this is why poison and strangulation are employed. Thus the Taozuo Spring and Autumn Annals says: “Fewer than half of rulers die of illness.” If the ruler does not understand this, calamities multiply. Therefore it is said: When many people benefit from the ruler’s death, the ruler is in danger. Thus Wang Liang loved his horses, and King Goujian of Yue loved his people—for battle and speed. The physician is skilled at sucking the patient’s wound and holding the patient’s blood; this is not due to blood kinship, but to self-interest. So the carriage-maker hopes others become wealthy and noble, while the coffin-maker hopes others die early. This is not because the carriage-maker is benevolent and the coffin-maker cruel, but because if others are not wealthy and noble, carriages will not sell; if others do not die, coffins will not sell. Their intent is not to hate others, but their benefit lies in others’ deaths. Thus when the faction of consorts, wives, and heirs is formed, they wish for the lord’s death; if the lord does not die, their power is not great. Their intent is not to hate the lord, but their benefit lies in the lord’s death. Therefore the ruler must be especially vigilant toward those who benefit from his death. Hence the sun and moon have halos, and calamities arise within; guard against those you hate, but disaster comes from those you love. Thus the enlightened ruler does not act on unverified matters, nor eat unusual foods; he listens from afar and observes what is near, to examine internal and external faults; distinguishes identical and different words, to understand factional divisions; uses cross-referencing and comparison, to verify the truth of his ministers’ words; grasps later situations to check against earlier statements; governs the multitude according to law; and observes all situations in comparison—thus no officer gains unearned rewards, and no one commits transgressive acts; executions are always just, and crimes are not pardoned; so the treacherous have no place to hide and pursue private gain.

When corvée labor is excessive, the people become toiled; when the people are toiled, power arises; when power arises, those exempt from corvée and taxes increase; when those exempt increase, the powerful become wealthy. Toiling the people to enrich the powerful, and raising power to aid ministers, is not the long-term benefit of the realm. Therefore it is said: When corvée labor is light, the people are at peace; when the people are at peace, there is no great power below; when there is no great power below, power diminishes; when power diminishes, then grace reverts to the ruler. Now water can overcome fire—this is evident; yet if a pot is placed between them, the water boils and dries above while the fire blazes below, and the water loses its ability to overcome fire. In the same way, law is used to suppress treachery, and it is more evident than water overcoming fire; yet if the ministers enforcing the law act like the pot, blocking its effect, then the clarity of law remains only in the ruler’s mind, having lost its power to suppress treachery. The words handed down from antiquity, recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals, show that those who violate the law and become great villains never fail to start with honorable ministers. Yet what the law guards against and punishment kills is often directed at the lowly—thus the people despair, with no place to appeal. Great ministers collude, blind the ruler, and unite as one; secretly they are friendly while outwardly showing enmity, to feign impartiality; they act as each other’s ears and eyes, to spy on the ruler’s weaknesses; the ruler is covered and blinded, unable to hear news, bearing the title of ruler without real power; ministers monopolize the law and implement it—such was the case with the King of Zhou. If the ruler privately lends power to his ministers, then the positions of superior and inferior will be reversed—this means the ruler’s power cannot be lent to his ministers.