Facing South

The ruler’s fault lies in this: having appointed a minister, he invariably turns around and uses those who have not been appointed to guard against him. Consequently, the proposals of those not appointed inevitably become hostile to the appointed minister, and the ruler ends up controlled by those not appointed. Now, those who participate in guarding against others are precisely those who were previously guarded against. If the ruler cannot make the laws clear to restrain the authority of his ministers, he cannot gain the trust of the common people. If the ruler abandons the laws and uses ministers to guard against ministers, then those who are fond of each other will form cliques and praise each other, while those who hate each other will form factions and slander each other. When slander and praise contend with each other, the ruler will be confused and benighted. For ministers, without reputation and solicitation they cannot advance; without violating the laws and acting arbitrarily they cannot establish authority; without borrowing the name of loyalty and trustworthiness they cannot avoid being prohibited. These three things are the means by which the ruler is benighted and the laws are destroyed. The ruler should ensure that even if a minister has wisdom and ability, he cannot violate the laws and act arbitrarily; even if he has virtuous conduct, he cannot surpass his merits and receive rewards prematurely; even if he has loyalty and trustworthiness, he cannot abandon the laws and remain unbound. This is called making the laws clear.

The ruler may be seduced by affairs or obstructed by speech. These two things must be examined. Ministers who speak lightly of affairs require little capital but deceive the ruler with their undertakings. If the ruler is seduced and does not examine them, and thus praises them, then the ministers will instead use their affairs to control the ruler. This is called being seduced. Those seduced by affairs will be trapped by calamities. When they speak, they demand little, but after withdrawing, their expenditures are great. Even if the affairs achieve merit, their speech is not trustworthy. Those who are untrustworthy are guilty; if affairs achieve merit but are not rewarded, then no minister will dare use false words to deceive the ruler. The ruler’s way of governance is to ensure that what a minister says earlier does not match what he says later, and what he says later does not match what he says earlier. Even if the affairs achieve merit, they must be made to bear the guilt. This is called the method of employing ministers.

When a minister plans affairs for the ruler but fears the ruler’s censure, he first puts forth a pretext and establishes a statement, saying: “Those who criticize this affair are jealous of it.” The ruler stores this statement in his heart and no longer listens to the opinions of the ministers. The ministers, fearing this statement, dare not discuss the affair. Once these two forces come into play, loyal ministers are not employed, and flatterers monopolize power. This is called being obstructed by speech. Those obstructed by speech are controlled by their ministers. The ruler’s way of governance is to make ministers bear responsibility both for speaking and for not speaking. Speaking without a thread of reasoning and arguing without verifiable evidence is the responsibility of speaking; using silence to evade responsibility and maintain a high position is the responsibility of not speaking. The ruler ensures that ministers who speak must be made to know the thread of their reasoning to demand its actuality, and ministers who do not speak must be asked about their choices to make them their responsibility. Then no minister will dare speak recklessly, nor will they dare remain silent. Both speaking and silence will then have their responsibilities.

When the ruler wants to undertake affairs, if he does not understand the beginning and end of the affair, but merely expresses his desire, then those who go to do it will gain no benefit and will surely suffer harm in return. One who understands this principle will follow reason and eliminate personal desires. In undertaking affairs, there is a principle: calculate that if the gain is greater than the expenditure, it can be done. A benighted ruler is not like this; he calculates only the gain, not the expenditure. Even if the expenditure is twice the gain, he does not know the harm. This is gaining in name but losing in reality. In such cases, the merit is small and the harm great. Generally, for merit, if the gain is greater than the expenditure, it can be called merit. Now, if great expenditure incurs no guilt, and small results are counted as merit, then ministers will expend great sums to achieve small merits. When small merits are achieved, the ruler is still harmed.

Those who do not understand governance will surely say: “Do not change the ancient ways; do not alter the constant norms.” Whether to change or not, the sage does not heed this; he only seeks correct governance. This being so, whether the ancient ways remain unchanged and the constant norms are unaltered depends on whether these ancient ways and constant norms are feasible. If Yi Yin had not changed the ancient ways of Shang, and if Jiang Taigong had not changed the ancient ways of Zhou, then Tang of Shang and King Wu of Zhou could not have become kings over all under Heaven. If Guan Zhong had not altered the old systems of Qi, and if Guo Yan had not reformed the old systems of Jin, then Duke Huan of Qi and Duke Wen of Jin could not have become hegemon over the feudal lords. Generally, what makes people reluctant to change ancient ways is the fear of disturbing the people’s settled habits. Those who do not change ancient ways follow the tracks of chaotic governance; those who cater to popular sentiment indulge in wicked behavior. The people are ignorant and do not know chaos; the ruler is weak and cannot reform. This is the error of governance. As a ruler, if he is wise enough to understand the way of governance and stern enough to enforce it, then even if he goes against the people’s will, he must establish his policies. This principle is seen in the story of Shang Yang guarding against internal threats and preparing with iron halberds and heavy shields. Thus, when Guo Yan began to govern, Duke Wen of Jin set up guards with soldiers; when Guan Zhong began to govern, Duke Huan of Qi equipped war chariots. This was a measure to guard against the people. Therefore, meeting with lazy and sluggish people, they are stingy with small costs and forget great benefits. Thus, the tiger was slandered with flattery. And changing small conveniences loses long-term advantages, so Zou Jia criticized the policy of carrying loads. Habituated to chaotic governance and uneasy with orderly rule, the people of Zheng could not be brought to submission.