Cherishing Ministers

If a favored minister becomes too close, he will inevitably endanger the ruler himself; if a minister becomes too eminent, he will inevitably alter the ruler’s authority; if consorts and concubines have no distinction in rank, they will inevitably harm the legitimate heir; if brothers are disobedient, they will inevitably endanger the state. I have heard that a lord of a thousand chariots, if without precaution, will surely have ministers of a hundred chariots at his side, who will seize his people and overturn his state; a lord of ten thousand chariots, if without precaution, will surely have families of a thousand chariots at his side, who will seize his power and overturn his state. Therefore, when treacherous ministers multiply and flourish, the ruler’s way of governance declines and perishes. Thus, when the power of the feudal lords becomes too great, it is a calamity for the Son of Heaven; when the mass of ministers becomes too wealthy, it is a failure for the ruler. When generals and chancellors control the ruler and expand their private influence, this is what the ruler must reject. Among all things, none is more honorable than the self, none more exalted than the ruler’s position; the ruler’s authority is weighty, and the ruler’s power is majestic. These four excellences need not be sought from outside, nor requested from others; if the ruler is skilled in planning, he can obtain them. Thus it is said: If the ruler cannot employ his own wealth, he will ultimately be cast out. This is what the ruler must bear in mind.

In former times, the fall of King Zhou of Shang and the decline of the Zhou dynasty were both due to the excessive power of the feudal lords; the partition of Jin and the usurpation of Qi were both due to the excessive wealth of the ministers. The regicides in Yan and Song were all cases of this kind. Therefore, comparing upward to Yin and Zhou, and in between to Yan and Song, there has been no case not caused by this. Hence, an enlightened ruler nurtures his ministers entirely by binding them with law and guarding against them with complete measures. Thus he does not pardon capital crimes nor lighten punishments; to pardon capital crimes and lighten punishments is called the dissipation of authority. The state will face danger, and its sovereign power will be dispersed. Therefore, although a minister’s stipend may be generous, he cannot rely on his authority to extort from the cities; although his faction may be numerous, he cannot maintain private soldiers. Thus, ministers have no private courts within their fiefs, no private dealings in the army, and their granaries may not make private loans to their clans. These are the methods by which an enlightened ruler prohibits treachery. Hence, when a minister goes out, he may not have more than four attendants, and his carriage may not carry weapons; if, without transmitting an urgent document or bearing an imperial summons, he loads his carriage with weapons and armor, he is sentenced to death without pardon. This is the means by which an enlightened ruler guards against unforeseen events.